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Abstract
The situation of long-distance in Europe rail has faced diﬀerent developments at liter-
ally diﬀerent speeds since the fall of the Iron Curtain. Relevant central European parts 
of the OEM Corridor (e. g. Germany, the Czech Republic, Austria and Hungary) ﬁrst 
suﬀered a considerable decline in cross-border long-distance rail traﬃc due to the 
emergence of low-cost airlines and the freedom of car purchase in the 1990s. Since 
the beginning of the millennium and partly following the 2004 accession of Middle and 
Eastern European countries to the European Union, a slight renaissance of Eurocity 
trains and market penetration of high-speed rail products can be perceived. The other 
countries in the eastern part of the corridor have mostly not recovered from the rail 
decline and lag behind. In Greece, rail development suﬀers generally from unfavour-
able conditions (diﬀerent track gauges and disproportion of land and population dis-
tribution) and a lack of innovation, and has thus been negatively impacted by the 
abovementioned boom of car and air. Its geographical isolation in Europe also plays a 
role. The political downturn of former Yugoslavia reinforced the situation. For passen-
ger rail along the corridor, the paper argues that considerable improvements in ser-
vice quality and travel time reduction can be made without doubtful high investment 
in high-speed rail infrastructure. Moreover, building up existing rail infrastructure may 
avoid giving up conventional rail services as shown for some high-speed rail cases.
Keywords
Long-distance transport – passenger rail – high-speed rail – integration – conventional 
rail
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Schienenpersonenfernverkehr: Bewertung und Weiterentwicklung
Kurzfassung
Der schienengebundene Personenfernverkehr in Europa hat sich seit dem Fall des Ei-
sernen Vorhangs mit buchstäblich unterschiedlichen Geschwindigkeiten unterschied-
lich entwickelt. Wichtige mitteleuropäische Teile des OEM Corridors (z. B. Deutsch-
land, Tschechien, Österreich und Ungarn) erfuhren aufgrund des Aufkommens von 
Billigﬂuggesellschaften und der „neuen“ Freiheit beim Kauf des eigenen PKW in den 
1990er Jahren zunächst einen erheblichen Rückgang des grenzüberschreitenden 
Schienenpersonenfernverkehrs. Seit der Jahrtausendwende und teilweise nach dem 
Beitritt mittel- und osteuropäischer Länder zur Europäischen Union im Jahr 2004 ist 
eine leichte Renaissance der Eurocity-Züge und die Marktausbreitung von Hochge-
schwindigkeits-Bahnprodukten zu verzeichnen. Weitere Länder im östlichen Teil des 
Korridors haben sich oft nicht vom Rückgang der Schieneninfrastruktur erholt und 
hinken hinterher. In Griechenland sind die Bedingungen für das System Schiene gene-
rell ungünstig (unterschiedliche Spurweiten und Missverhältnis bei Siedlungs- und Be-
völkerungsverteilung) und mangelnder Innovation und wurde daher durch den oben 
genannten PKW-Boom und ansteigendes Luftverkehrsaufkommen negativ beein-
ﬂusst. Auch die geograﬁsche Randlage Griechenlands in Europa spielt eine Rolle. Der 
politische Abschwung im ehemaligen Jugoslawien verstärkte diese Situation. Der Bei-
trag legt dar, dass erhebliche Verbesserungen bei der Servicequalität und der Verkür-
zung der Reisezeiten ohne fragwürdig hohe Investitionen in den Hochgeschwindig-
keitsverkehr auf der Schiene erreicht werden können. Darüber hinaus kann durch 
einen Ausbau der bestehenden Schieneninfrastruktur vermieden werden, den klassi-
schen Fernverkehr aufzugeben, wie die Entwicklung des Hochgeschwindigkeitsver-
kehrs andernorts in Europa verdeutlicht.
Schlüsselwörter
Schienenpersonenfernverkehr – Hochgeschwindigkeitsverkehr – Integration – klassi-
scher Fernverkehr
1 Rail development in Europe
The situation of the European rail network is basically a result of state policies and the 
geographical context. Furthermore, the European rail network development induced 
a change of morphology in settlement structures. Rail networks throughout Europe 
were mainly completed by 1910 (Martí-Henneberg 2013). For the countries of the 
Orient/East-Med Corridor (OEM) it can be observed that by this time Austria and 
Hungary had quite a dense rail network with Budapest and Wien as important nodes 
and subsequent radial infrastructure. The network also included continuous lines to-
wards present-day western Romania and northern Serbia, which were part of this Aus-
tro-Hungarian Empire. Bulgaria was separated from this Empire in 1878 and saw a 
further decline in international connections, which is explained by the national-orient-
ed policy promoted by the newly established kingdom (Dzhaleva-Chonkova 2007). 
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After World War II, considerable network extensions such as the link to Turkey or 
Thessaloniki and a bridge over the Danube were realized (Dzhaleva-Chonkova 2007). 
In the territory of former Yugoslavia, the mountainous topography did not allow the 
development of a comprehensive network, as is also true for the inner area of the 
Czech Republic and the area of Slovakia, separated in 1993. Poland, divided between 
diﬀerent powers when rail network development took place, nowadays faces varied 
rail network characteristics (Martí-Henneberg 2013). 
Before the 1990s but after World War II, some industrialized western European coun-
tries such as France, Germany and Italy steadily reduced their network. In contrast, for 
the eastern European countries, Martí-Henneberg (2013: 136) found that in the post 
World War II period the historically grown “…railway networks have been largely main-
tained with relatively few changes (Howkins 1996). When other countries began to 
close railway lines, the regimes in power in these countries generally sought to main-
tain their public sector infrastructure. However, subsequent economic diﬃculties 
have made it almost impossible to modernize these networks and their rail services.” 
Since the fall of the Iron Curtain, rail network and long-distance rail in Europe face 
diﬀerent developments at literally diﬀerent speeds. Relevant central European parts 
of the corridor (e. g. Germany, the Czech Republic, Austria, Hungary) ﬁrst suﬀered a 
considerable decline in cross-border long-distance rail traﬃc due to the emergence of 
low-cost airlines and the freedom of car purchase in the 1990s (Martí-Henneberg 
2013). Since the beginning of the millennium and partly following the 2004 accession 
of east European countries to the European Union, a slight renaissance of Eurocity 
trains and market penetration of high-speed rail products can be perceived in central 
European countries (see Chapter 4: Long-distance rail: Between snail and power 
speed). The other countries in the eastern part of the corridor mostly have not recov-
ered from the rail decline and lag behind. As will be shown in Chapter 3, the quality of 
rail infrastructure could be in better shape, as put in a nutshell by this quotation from 
the corridor report: “Hungary is the border between the densely used, well main-
tained Northern part of the corridor and the less densely used and less maintained 
Southern part of the corridor” (Panteia 2012: 28). This diﬀerence is also conﬁrmed by 
the illustration of population development. Whereas population in central European 
countries still increased from 2007 until 2017, the population in the countries east of 
Hungary, including the latter, decreased by 3 % (Greece/Hungary) to 6 % (Bulgaria) 
including Serbia with a 5 % decrease.1
Further to the south, Romania and, even more so, Bulgaria suﬀer most from the de-
clining quality of rail and network (Panteia 2012). For Greece, this can also be ob-
served though rail development suﬀers generally from unfavorable conditions such as 
diﬀerent rail gauges and mismatches in land and population distribution. Most of the 
rural network is built in narrow gauge whereas only the main lines are built with the 
standard gauge of 1435 mm (Efstratiadis 1959). For further railway development to 
link the important centers there is little space in the narrow valleys where lines could 
be exploited. Mainland Greece accounts for 81 % of the area of the country but only 
1  http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/population-demography-migration-projections/population-data/
main-tables (July 13 2018).
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66 % of the population; the capital in the south absorbs 18 % of the population. Densi-
ty is 50 inhabitants per km² on the mainland. The population is mainly concentrated 
along the coast and within 0–200 m height (66 %) but this part of the territory only 
accounts for 33 % of the area of the country (Efstratiadis 1959). Greece’s geographi-
cal isolation in Europe also plays a role. The political decline of former Yugoslavia rein-
forced the situation, at least by the fact that all through-running trains such as the 
Hellas-Express (Verona–Athina) or Attika-Express (München–Athina) were closed. 
Athina became the end of the rail corridor, since the narrow gauge lines towards the 
Peloponnese peninsula had been removed. However, once Romania and Bulgaria en-
tered the European Union in 2007, Greece became more internationally oriented, 
though there is a considerable relationship with the adjacent Western Balkan (Panteia 
2012). 
Fig. 1: Same corridor – two diﬀerent rail worlds at each end: Hamburg Main Station (largest station in 
Germany) and the modernized Athina Larissa Station 20172 / Source: Author (left); Mathias Nieder- 
maier (right)
2 Context of this paper
The paper provides an overview of long-distance rail along the corridor and assesses 
the potential for improvements based on existing plans and literature. To do so, it re-
ﬂects on the suitability of high-speed rail for the corridor and then analyses the exist-
ing supply, explores the potential for better train services, and includes planned mea-
sures for infrastructural and operational improvement of the lines. The paper ﬁrst 
looks at long-distance travel in general and its development. It then provides an inven-
tory of rail passenger services along the corridor, identiﬁes gaps and potential for 
improvement, predominantly expressed in terms of gained travel time. The projects 
identiﬁed by the European Union and in the countries, as known basically from the 
Connectivity Agenda summits and – if possible – national documents or inquiries with 
experts will be considered. Based on existing literature the appropriateness of 
long-distance rail strategies such as high-speed rail will be assessed.
2  The new Larissa Station with more platforms was opened in 2017 next to the former station.
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Prior to continuing, in this paper the original names of the cities and their stations are 
used as is common in international rail. This work focuses on long-distance rail pas-
senger traﬃc and covers the entire Orient/East-Med Corridor. 
3 Infrastructural situation of the corridor for passenger rail
The work plan issued by the Coordinator for the Orient/East-Med Corridor, Mathieu 
Grosch, intends to monitor the fulﬁllment of some so-called key performance indica-
tors for the rail lines of the corridor such as electriﬁcation or line operational speed at 
100 km/h minimum (Grosch 2018). Single-track lines predominantly exist in Romania, 
Bulgaria and in parts of southern Greece but also to a lesser extent on two German 
coastal lines and on the Slovakian-Hungarian border. By 2015, 26 % of the corridor was 
still single-track. Beyond the scope of this EU-corridor but relevant for the develop-
ment of the full axis is the 350 km line from Budapest to Beograd. From Beograd to 
Velika Plana (southern Serbia) the line is still single track and then becomes fully dou-
ble-track. With respect to electriﬁcation, the Serbian part of the corridor is fully elec-
triﬁed.3 The OEM Corridor is 89 % electriﬁed. Only small segments in Germany, Greece 
and from the Romanian City of Craiova to the Bulgarian border are lacking electriﬁca-
tion. For the development of high-quality competitive passenger rail, line operating 
speed is relevant. With 78 % compliance along the corridor, the infrastructure’s per-
formance is quite well in line with the work plan’s requirement of a minimum 100 km/h 
speed. Only Bulgaria is behind since the full segment from the Romanian to the Greek 
border is aﬀected with speeds not exceeding 60–90 km/h. Nonetheless, there are sev-
eral nodes along the corridor with similar performance problems such as Brno, Buda-
pest and Arad, stressing a relevant gap that aﬀects line operation as well (European 
Commission 2016). The Budapest–Beograd–Thessaloniki stretch also suﬀers from
Fig. 2: Corridor capacity and performance challenges Budapest–Beograd: waiting times at borders (e. g. 
Kelebia, Hungary, left) and single-track infrastructure produce travel time losses / Source: Author
3  http://www.srbvoz.rs (November 14, 2017).
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low speeds. The OEM-study demonstrates that cross-border infrastructure manage-
ment is still a challenge which also contributes to considerable time losses in freight 
but also passenger travel. Herein, the corridor segment Hungarian-Romanian border 
to the Bulgarian-Greek border is worth mentioning since cross-border time losses are 
also due to a lack of technical harmonization resulting from varied compliance with 
key performance indicators (Grosch 2016). This technical obstacle becomes an ad-
ministrative issue when considering the time of almost 1 hour that passenger trains 
wait at both sides of the Hungarian-Serbian border due to customs and shunting ac-
tivities on the border. 
4 Long-distance rail: Between snail and power speed
The European Union issued the White Paper on Transport in 2011. Passenger-related 
issues comprise a trebling of high-speed rail infrastructure by 2030, a shift from road 
and air to rail for medium distances by 50 % and a target reduction of CO2-emissions 
of 60 % by 2050. For rail, these ambitious goals would require substantial investment 
(European Commission 2011). Speaking of high-speed rail, this means the construc-
tion of infrastructure with an operating maximum speed of 250 km/h or higher if new 
infrastructure is considered, but also of 200 km/h and upwards if services are run on 
upgraded conventional rail lines (Council of the European Union 1996). Though high-
speed rail (HSR) has achieved some positive changes in mode split, there are some 
impacts that should be brieﬂy reviewed. Building one kilometer of high-speed rail is 
expected to cost at least 5 million euros. This is derived from an analysis based on 
HSR-constructions in 2005 according to Nash (2015). This analysis reveals that for 
Europe, costs per kilometer can be estimated at around 25–29 million euros as was 
found for Italy or Germany. Presumably the prices are higher nowadays and further 
increase is to be assumed if considering relevant constructions such as bridges or 
tunnels (Nash 2015). A conventional line is supposed to cost 20 % less, as seen while 
considering the discussion on the British High-Speed 2 project linking London to me-
tropolises such as Birmingham or Manchester (Nash 2015). Furthermore, high-speed 
rail is beneﬁcial if larger cities of around 500,000 inhabitants and more are connected 
and trains calling at stations 120–150 km apart (Vickerman 2015). For rail services 
running over distances of up to 700 km competition with air is feasible. Speed is any-
how a relative term. While the maximum speed of the Tokyo–Osaka line in Japan is 
270 km/h, it attains a higher average speed of 213 km/h compared to the 171 km/h of 
the fastest German HSR-line Köln–Frankfurt am Main with a maximum speed of 
300 km/h (Arnone/Delmastro/Endemann et al. 2016). Adding a new stop leads to a loss 
in average speed but at the same time may open the door for new customers. Thus, a 
trade-oﬀ between speed/travel time and potential ridership is required (Givoni 2006). 
Vickerman (2015) discusses the potential of HSR generating demand among commut-
ers, as is the case for the Javelin HST, which allows daily commuting from Kent to 
London, and the French TGV in the Nord-Pas de Calais region. Analyses from the 
Roma–Napoli corridor suggest that around 6 % of trips are made for commuting pur-
poses, but a high proportion of trips are made for business reasons (ranging from 
38.7 % on Sundays to 57.4 % on weekdays), while education-related trips (percentages 
ranging from 3.4 % on Sundays to 6.2 % on weekdays) and ‘other purpose’ trips (per-
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centages ranging from 52.5 % on Sundays to 30.2 % on weekdays) show lower but still 
very signiﬁcant rates (Cascetta/Coppola/Velardi 2013). In addition to trip purpose, the 
mode shift eﬀect for HSR needs to be assessed. Shifting demand from air to HSR is 
one aspect. This is conﬁrmed by the substantial shift that can be observed for the 
Paris–Lyon line and the Madrid–Sevilla lines 3 years after their opening in 1981 and 
respectively in 1991 (Givoni 2006). In the case of Madrid–Sevilla, the market share of 
air travel was reduced from 40 to 13 %, while train ridership rose from 16 to 51 %. For 
Paris–Lyon, the share of air travel dropped from 31 to 7 % and train travel increased 
from 40 to 72 %. The impact on the amount of car travel is lower if one considers the 
overall increase in train trips of 37 % in the Paris–Lyon case and 35 % with respect to 
the Madrid–Sevilla line (Givoni 2006). Nonetheless, the car is an important competi-
tor for HSR, especially for shorter distances. For the Barcelona–Madrid HSR line, 
opened in 2007, a survey carried out in 2009 revealed that 44 % of the customers used 
the car before shifting to rail, 8 % used the bus, 16 % made their trip by plane and an-
other 23 % ‘moved’ from other conventional trains to HSR. The remaining 10 % can be 
considered induced traﬃc (Frontier Economics/Atkins/ITS Leeds 2011). A before-af-
ter study in Italy comparing the modal split between 2009 and 2013 made by Cascetta 
and Coppola (2015) proves that HSR can gain market shares also from the car, which 
was reduced by 19 % in relative terms, but started from a higher level than the airplane. 
The number of air trips was reduced by 29 %, but its share is relatively low. HSR in-
creased by 81 % from 2009 to 2013, but conventional train travel lost about 52 % of its 
users within these four years. This latter case and the Madrid–Barcelona case reveal 
another aspect: the loss of customers for conventional rail services. Givoni and Do-
bruszkes (2013) report that up to 94 % of users in the case of Madrid–Sevilla no longer 
used conventional trains once HSR was introduced. On the Sanyo Shinkansen line in 
Japan (from Osaka 554 km to Fukuoka in the south), 55 % of the traﬃc was diverted 
to the new line from conventional rail services, while the remaining demand arises 
from other travel modes (23 % from air, 16 % from car and bus, and 6 % induced de-
mand; quoted by Givoni 2006). In view of this information, the cost of rail infrastruc-
ture designed to deliver air substitution should be discussed as the land-use transport 
nexus may be threatened as mentioned above. The emergence of new stations at the 
edge of towns or in greenﬁeld areas, which the authors qualify as ‘TGV-generation 
stations’, are supported as a driver of development by the European Commission 
(2010). However, such stations make integration between rail and land-use and be-
tween conventional rail lines and their supply more diﬃcult (European Commission 
2010). Although the OEM Corridor is very long, its suitability for high-speed rail ap-
pears to be limited since it is comparatively small if compared to the 1300 km Rhine-Al-
pine Corridor with some 70 million inhabitants. Furthermore, there is little potential 
for large metropolises to be connected, the countries are small and the international 
and the more relevant domestic markets appear to be limited. Related to this, several 
border-crossings may act as limiting factors for generating corresponding traveler 
volumes. This is suggested according to several experts’ interventions at a workshop 
organized in Praha and summarized by Jandova et al. (2016). The workshop also con-
cludes that an approach similar to Germany should be pursued, which means upgrad-
ing lines and building new high-speed rail lines where capacity restraints most require 
it. In view of the costs for a dedicated HSR-line, such an approach appears to be more 
promising. In the next section, the supply levels along the corridor are described.
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5 Long-distance rail supply and demand along the corridor
To assess the supply along the OEM Corridor, the timetables from the year 2016 were 
analysed. Three main sources were used for this and a typical Tuesday selected as a 
reference to gain an impression of daily train movements.4
Fig. 3: Overview of long-distance rail services in 2016 / Source: Author’s elaboration based on timetables5
4  Sources used: www.bahn.de (German Railways); http://www.srbvoz.rs/eng/timetable.html (Serbian 
Railways); European Rail Timetable Ltd, European Rail Timetable Winter 2015/2016, europeanrail 
timetable.eu and Czech Railways http://jizdenka.idos.cz/IT.aspx?Lang=69 which was very helpful for 
calculating rail distances.
5  www.bahn.de (German Railways); http://www.srbvoz.rs/eng/timetable.html (Serbian Railways); 
European Rail Timetable Ltd, European Rail Timetable Winter 2015/2016, europeanrailtimetable.eu 
and Czech Railways http://jizdenka.idos.cz/IT.aspx?Lang=69.
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Figure 3 visualises the number of trains on relevant segments of the corridor, travel 
time between the respective rail stations and time in the stations which in most cases 
is also transfer time until the next train leaves. 
Concerning the connections, the most dense services can be found between Ham-
burg and Berlin, within the Czech Republic and from there towards Bratislava as well 
as between Wien and Budapest. On these stretches, train services are oﬀered almost 
every hour. For the other connections in central Europe there are at least bihourly 
connections. The transfer or stopping time is reasonable. It is important to stress that 
when travelling along the OEM Corridor, in most cases a transfer in Praha is necessary. 
Then direct services exist from Praha to Budapest via Brno and Bratislava and to Wien 
and further south to the Austrian city of Graz. 
Fig. 4: Czech-Austro Railjet train in Wien (left) allowing seamless transfer for trains to Budapest-Keleti 
with hourly services (right) / Source: Author
Wien can be considered an interesting interchange point since the aforementioned 
north-south axis meets an important west-east line München–Wien–Budapest. In es-
sence, from Hamburg to Budapest there exists an integrated network with frequent 
and interconnected services without considerable time losses. Of course, there is po-
tential for higher commercial speeds. Beyond Budapest – at least in the neighboring 
countries towards the east – the standard of travel times is substantially lower. This is 
due to larger transfer times, fewer services, losses following infrastructural restric-
tions and border issues as shown hereafter (Tab. 1). 
In these east European countries commercial speed levels are quite low at around 
50 km/h. It is Greece where speeds are slightly higher, allowing almost 100 km/h of 
commercial speed with six train services throughout the day. However, according to 
the information given in the meeting in Athina in November 2016, there are also com-
peting bus and plane services between Athina and Thessaloniki. For the whole corri-
dor Hamburg6–Athina, Table 1 and Table 2 evidence some of the time losses that ap-
pear avoidable if the technical standards were harmonized or services better 
6  For further explanation see CODE 24 action 17 team (2015).
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integrated. Note that only time losses longer than 15 minutes are noted. A minimum 
of 15 minutes was considered acceptable to make sure that train transfers can be 
made or if a train needs to change direction in a station. This threshold was deter-
mined at an expert roundtable held in a European project and applies to both Table 1 
and Table 2 (CODE 24 action 17 team 2015). Following this exercise, there is a loss of 
around 3:31 hours if travelling from Hamburg to Athina via Beograd and even 11:44 
hours via the Romanian city Timisoara and Soﬁa. The latter is mainly due to the fact 
that the connection in Soﬁa requires an overnight stay. 
Fig. 5: Athina Larissa station: timetable at a glance for the ﬁve daily and one night services Athina– 
Thesaloniki and new art at the former platforms / Source: Irini Frezadou
Station Time losses > 15 min
Budapest Keleti (ȝ Timisoara/Soﬁa) 00:51
Budapest Keleti (ȝ Beograd/Skopje) 00:46
Timisoara Nord 00:35
Beograd 02:20
Soﬁa 09:39
Skopje 00:25
Thessaloniki 00:39
Tab. 1: Considerable time losses in stations mainly due to transfer times / Source: Author’s adaptation 
from railway timetables for the year 2016
With respect to time losses ‘en route’ according to Table 2, around 4 hours between 
Hamburg and Athina will be lost if travelling through Beograd and a bit more than 2 
hours if using the axis within the European Union. Of course, the longer stay in Soﬁa 
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makes travelling on this axis less convenient. From Budapest to Beograd, there are 
three daily services. Then a transfer is necessary to continue towards Nis and Thessa-
loniki. In 2016, there was only one daily service Beograd–Thessaloniki and return. The 
number of daily train services east of Budapest also decreases considerably if travel-
ling via Romania and Bulgaria. From Budapest to Timisoara in Romania, there are ﬁve 
train pairs a day, then only 2–3 connections between Timisoara and Soﬁa are oﬀered. 
It is worth mentioning that within Romania, 2–3 additional connections exist.7 From 
Soﬁa to Thessaloniki there is only one daily train pair currently requiring a transfer at 
the border. Inside Greece, the number of trains increases up to six direct trains Thes-
saloniki–Athina (Fig. 3).
Stretch Time losses >  15 min
Budapest – Beograd 00:58
Budapest –  Timisoara Nord 00:50
Timisoara Nord – Soﬁa 01:39
Beograd –  Soﬁa 01:36
Soﬁa – Thessaloniki 01:17
Beograd – Skopje 00:16
Skopje –  Thessaloniki 00:32
Tab. 2: Considerable time losses along some stretches due to stopping time in stations /  
Source: Author’s adaptation from railway timetables for the year 2016
Excursus: a look backwards
As indicated in the introduction, the corridor suﬀered from the consequences of the 
Balkan crisis in terms of standards of service and travel times. The timetable of the 
year 1983 identiﬁes three daily through train services (central Europe)–Beograd–
Athina. The travel times at that time were 2 hours longer than in 2016. However, for 
the remaining connection Beograd–Thessaloniki the journey was actually 1 hour lon-
ger in 2016 than in 1983 (SBB 1983). Brezina/Abramović/Shibayama et al. (2018) illus-
trate impressively the decline in frequency and service quality for the former Yugosla-
vian trunk line Ljubljana–Zagreb–Beograd. Rail quality achieved a certain peak by the 
end of the 1980s with 22–27 daily services between these cities and an increase in the 
average commercial speed – deﬁned as the average running speed between two sta-
tions without considering stopping time – of up to 76 km/h in 1990. Since the war on 
the former Yugoslavian territory this speed has remained at a lower level of 61–63 km/h. 
Observations end in 2015 when the lowest number of only ﬁve daily train services can 
be observed. This seems even to be deteriorating as the timetable of 2018 only indi-
cates two daily services.8
7  https://cfrcalatori.ro/ (November 14, 2017).
8  www.bahn.de
167LO N G - D I S TA N CE PA S S EN G ER R A I L  S ER V I CE S:  R E V I E W A N D I M PR OV E M EN T
Fig. 6: Predicted interzonal passenger traﬃc by rail for the year 2030 in 1000 pax /  
Source: European Commission 2014
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This stresses the negative impact of the deterioration of rail development in the West-
ern Balkan countries such as Serbia and its neighbors. Another aspect to consider is 
that even after the fall of former Yugoslavia, the timetable for the year 2000 reveals 
travel times between Beograd and Budapest of 7 hours compared to 8 hours as indi-
cated for the timetable of 2016.9 Thus, political turmoil paired with infrastructure 
maintenance problems may have caused a decline in quality and frequency.
Information on rail passenger demand is not easily available. Figure 6 gives an impres-
sion of the predicted ﬂows between NUTS 2 zones (regions) for EU countries along 
the corridor for the year 2030. These ﬁgures correspond to those observed for the 
year 2010 as baseline year for the predictions (European Commission 2014). It can 
easily be perceived that the abovementioned 2016 based levels of supply are reﬂected 
in the demand today and in future. West of Budapest, rail is heavily used, east of Bu-
dapest, the ﬁgures are more modest.
Fig. 7: Relative change in rail use in EU-countries 2003–2013 / Source: European Commission 2016: 6
Available data on demand for the EU Members show that in 2013 Austria (AT), Germa-
ny (DE) and Hungary (HU) showed the highest amount of kilometers travelled per 
inhabitant, followed by Hungary, the Czech Republic (CZ) and Slovakia (SK). Bulgaria 
(BG), Romania (RO) and Greece (EL) are located at the lower end. What is even more 
striking is the relative change in national rail use in the respective Member States with 
9  Thomas Cook Timetable for 2000, retrieved from https://www.drehscheibe-online.de/foren/read.
php?30,7421240 (May 21, 2019).
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even reversing trends that reinforce the discrepancies between central European and 
eastern European countries. Another issue is the decreasing population ﬁgures in 
some of these countries (Fig. 7). While ridership increased in central European coun-
tries such as Austria, Germany, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, demand decreased in 
Hungary, Bulgaria, Greece and Romania. It can thus be concluded that rail demand is 
related to declining supply levels in these eastern European countries, though Hunga-
ry may be an exception as it still has considerable train service levels. 
6 Potential for improvement 
The market studies made by the European Commission have already revealed some 
potential for improvement, i. e. through compliance with key performance indicators 
such as line speed, electriﬁcation, elimination of single-track lines, cross-border in-
teroperability and ﬁlling gaps in the high-speed network. The objective is to remove 
these bottlenecks and to develop the corridor (European Commission 2014). This list 
includes the nodes of Berlin, Budapest, Bratislava and Soﬁa, the high-speed lines from 
Dresden to Wien, high-speed modernization of a segment in Romania (Arad–Caranse-
beş) on the line Budapest–Soﬁa and modernization/electriﬁcation of other lines not 
yet fulﬁlling the corridor compliance criteria. There is a further project list by the Eu-
ropean Union and the Western Balkan countries in the context of the Connectivity 
Agenda which includes the rail connection from Nis to Soﬁa (European Commission 
2017). These lists do not contain expected eﬀects on better connectivity and subse-
quent travel time savings. However, during the IAK group’s 3 years of work, some in-
formation from Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Germany, Greece and Serbia 
could be collected which led to an estimation of travel time changes along certain 
segments of the corridor. 
Fig. 8: The new site of the Beograd Centar Station (left, opened in 2017) at the periphery of the centre 
but enabling through services unlike the former central station (right) /  Source: Author
The following Table 3 thus contains quantiﬁable improvements that are expected 
from these measures or that were speciﬁed in other documents, mainly issued by 
state ministries, rail networks or rail operating companies. It also includes information 
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the working group received and collected during its working phase. Furthermore, it 
was assumed that waiting times could be reduced to a maximum of 15 minutes at sta-
tions or at borders as was suggested in Table 2. 
Fig. 9: The modernised central station of Soﬁa nowadays hosts few train services / Source: Author
Regardless of the unknown travel time eﬀects of better network characteristics after 
having realized the projects in the corridor work plan, travel time could be further 
reduced by addressing the stopping times ﬁgured out in Table 2 in Section 5. Some of 
them are already included in projects such as the Budapest-Beograd line. For the re-
maining gaps and considering the outcome presented in Table 3 above, the following 
travel times may be achieved in the future while assuming that all waiting times will be 
reduced to a maximum of 15 minutes. Better customs and train logistics at the border 
may allow a further reduction of travel time. Table 4 consequently reveals consider-
able travel time reductions for connections via Czech Republic and Serbia as well as 
Bulgaria as information was available for these countries. Also, the reduction for the 
connection Thessaloniki–Athina will increase rail competitiveness for international 
travel and especially for the Greek domestic market. However, for the segments Beo-
grad–Thessaloniki and Budapest–Soﬁa, the journeys still will take more time. The basis 
for Table 4 was the 2016 timetable using the corridor as outlined in Figure 3.
It should further be noted that the improvements along this corridor will also contrib-
ute to maintaining demand on this axis. If no measures are realized, the connections 
from Hamburg or Berlin to Wien via Nürnberg would be more competitive with better 
travel times and more services than travelling along the corridor. In the future, Soﬁa 
will be potentially better connected with services via Beograd once the upgraded Bu-
dapest-Beograd line starts operations. These shorter travel times are thus presented 
in a special column ‘competitive routes’. Thus, Beograd becomes more important. 
This is reinforced by the introduction of the new station Beograd Centar in 2017, al-
lowing some additional travel time savings and through-running services without lo-
comotives needing to change direction. Greek locations are anyway better connected 
to central Europe using the route via Beograd. An integration of Serbia with the hub 
Beograd would widen the opportunities since the travel times from Budapest will be 
considerably shorter if stopping in the Serbian capital.
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Tab. 3: Current and potential future travel times for long-distance trains along the corridor / Source: 
Author’s adaptation from diﬀerent sources mentioned hereafter: 
> Deutsche Bahn (2015): Mehr Bahn für Metropolen und Regionen, Presentation 18 March 2015   
 (source number 1) 
> SMWA/Deutsche Bahn (Study 2015) by SMWA-Ministry 2018 (2) 
> CZ Ministerstvo dopravy/SMWA (Study 2015) by SMWA-Ministry 2018 (3) 
> Švehlík, M. (2015) (4) 
> https://www.szdc.cz/en/pro-media/tiskove-zpravy/studie-praha-brno.html (5) 
> www.bahn.de (6) 
> Assumptions by the author of down to 15 min travel time savings (cf. CODE 24 Action 17 Team   
 2015) (7) 
> http://www.optransport.bg/upload/docs/OPTTI_ENG_17112014_verision_1.pdf (8) 
> Danailova, N. (2017). Presentation at IAK-meeting, Soﬁa, 21 November 2017 (9) 
> Greek Ministry of Economy and Development/ERGOSE (2017). (19) 
> CZ Ministerstvo dopravy (11) 
> BMVIT (2018). Written communication on Austrian/ÖBB-plans (12) 
> https://ec.europa.eu/transport/sites/transport/ﬁles/oem_project_list.pdf (13) 
> Meeting with Milutin Ignjatovic, Serbian Institute of Transportation (CIP), April 2017 (14)
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Connection 2016 2030 Competitive Routes
Hamburg - Praha 06:41 04:11  
Hamburg - Wien 10:53 06:53 09:21 h via Nürnberg (2016)
Berlin - Budapest 11:28 07:31
Berlin - Beograd 20:22 10:31
Berlin - Wien 08:48 05:08 08:15 h via Nürnberg (2018)
Praha - Budapest 06:39 04:52
Praha - Beograd 15:33 07:37
Wien - Beograd 11:31 05:20
Wien - Soﬁa 24:59 22:24
23:30 h via Boegrad (2018)
15:42 h via Beograd (2030)
Bratislava - Soﬁa 25:04 22:46
24:23 h via Beograd (2018)
16:04 h via Beograd (2030)
Budapest - Thessaloniki 24:45 16:49
Budapest - Athinai 30:42 21:44
Beograd - Athinai 20:14 18:44
Timisoara - Thessaloniki 32:33 21:35
Soﬁa - Athinai 12:59 11:10  
Tab. 4: Current and potential future travel times for long-distance connections / Source: Author’s  
adaptation based on outcome of previous table
7 Conclusion
The analysis of the current passenger train connections, underlying infrastructure 
and operational situation showed some potential for saving travel time along the cor-
ridor. Apart from the plans in the Czech Republic, the line upgrade Budapest–Beograd 
and the plans in Bulgaria, all other known measures indicate potential for improve-
ment without huge investments. Concerning the latter, it is beneﬁcial to long-distance 
and regional passenger as well as freight rail. The look back in time also suggests that 
rail can achieve a lot more. Furthermore, it can be assumed that many of the stations 
served nowadays will also be connected in the future.10 Of course, the eastern Euro-
pean countries still need some increases in commercial speed in order to raise the 
competitiveness of rail in the domestic as well as the international market. Such an 
underlying ‘conservative’ and generally less costly approach appears more promising 
than developing pure high-speed lines. The investment in high-speed rail ﬁrst requires 
10 Meeting with the Serbian Transportation Institute. 
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high volumes of ﬁnancial resources may contribute to increasing disparity and even 
not be beneﬁcial since the level of demand would not justify the necessary ﬁnance that 
would then be missing for other investments. This is criticized for many Spanish pe-
ripheral regions where the station at the edge of the city or between two cities often 
lacks good access to public transport or even rail (Martí-Henneberg 2013). It may be 
a lesson to learn for the Balkan part of the corridor. Apart from this, given the some-
what small amount of population along the lines, HSR would cannibalize conventional 
rail and further make integration into the existing rail network diﬃcult with conse-
quences for regional accessibility. Rail may also forfeit its function as a backbone for 
development and even a trigger for more balanced development of central and pe-
ripheral regions in these countries, as was the situation at the turn of the 19th/20th 
century (Martí-Henneberg 2017). Nowadays, there is even a risk of emptying the rural 
areas in addition to the general reduction of population, as is the case in some eastern 
European countries such as Bulgaria (Troeva 2017). This does not mean that all places 
are equal, but all areas and regions have similar opportunities according to their loca-
tion and function in the system of central places, as Christaller suggests. For these 
countries, European coherence in a geographical sense and beyond a pure EU-per-
spective will open opportunities faster than the projects envisaged for these coun-
tries. This is not a plea against the development of rail infrastructures in these cohe-
sion countries. It is a recognition that geographical and transport movements cannot 
be determined by administrative borders or even burdens. It is important to recall that 
development of the axis through Romania and Bulgaria needs to be pushed to encour-
age national and interregional cohesion in this area. The axis through Serbia may fulﬁl 
another important, predominantly transit function in better connecting Greece with 
central Europe for passenger rail – and of course also for freight, as suggested by 
Panteia (2012). Strategically, the Balkan link via Serbia cannot be neglected although 
it appears logical that, as part of the OEM Corridor, Greece’s access to the remaining 
part of the European Union plays an important role in terms of getting infrastructure 
more easily funded. 
Literature
Arnone, M.; Delmastro, T.; Endemann, P.; Otsuka, N.; Pensa, S.; Rosa, A. (2016): Towards an Integrat-
ed Railway Network along the Corridor Genoa-Rotterdam. In: Drewello, H. and B. Scholl (Ed.) Integrat-
ed Spatial and Transport Infrastructure Development on the European North-South Corridor Rotter-
dam – Genoa. Springer. Heidelberg.
Brezina, T; Abramović, B.; Shibayama, T.; Jelisić, S.; Šipuš, D.; Zlokapa, B. (2018). Barriers to 
Trans-national passenger Rail services in the Western Balkans - The quantitative background // Proceed-
ings of the Fourth International Conference on Traﬃc and Transport Engineering / Čokorilo, Olja (ur.). 
Beograd: City Net Scientiﬁc Research Center Ltd. Belgrade, 2018, 717–724.
Cascetta, E; Coppola, P.; Velardi, V. (2013): High-speed rail demand: before-and-after evidence from 
the Italian market. In: disP. Plann Rev 49(2):51–59.
Cascetta, E.; Coppola, P. (2015): New High-Speed Rail Lines and Market Competition. In: Transporta-
tion Research Record: Journal of the Transportation Research Board 2475, 8–15.
CODE 24 Action 17 Team (2015): High-Speed Rail Integration to Corridor 24. Final Report.  
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/bcde/16e23e8454c729b36cfe781b8d218287759e.pdf 
(November 1, 2019)
Council of the European Union (1996): COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 96/48/EC of 23 July 1996 on the interop-
erability of the trans-European high-speed rail system. Brussel/Bruxelles.
Dzhaleva-Chonkova, A. (2007): Balkan Railways Development: Contradictions in the Past, Coopera-
tion at Present. In: Mechanics, Transport, Communications Academic Journal 2007 (3), No. 0197.
174 12 _  S PAT I A L A N D T R A N S P O R T I N F R A S T R U C T U R E D E V ELO PM EN T I N EU R O PE
Efstratiadis, D. (1959): Die Eisenbahnen Griechenlands. Jahrbuch des Eisenbahnwesens 10.
European Commission (2010): High-speed Europe – A Sustainable link between citizens. Luxembourg: 
Publications Oﬃce of the European Union.
European Commission (2011): WHITE PAPER Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area – Towards 
a competitive and resource eﬃcient transport system COM(2011)0144. Brussel/Bruxelles.
European Commission (2014): Orient/East-Med Core Network Corridor Study, Final Report, Decem-
ber 2014. Brussel/Bruxelles.
European Commission (2016): Study on the prices and quality of rail passenger services. Study pre-
pared by Steer Davies Gleave. Brussel/Bruxelles. 
https://ec.europa.eu/transport/sites/transport/ﬁles/modes/rail/studies/doc/2016-04-price-quality-rail-
pax-services-ﬁnal-report.pdf (July 15, 2019).
European Commission (2017): Co-ﬁnancing of Investment Projects in the Western Balkans. Brussel/
Bruxelles.
Frontier Economics, Atkins, ITS Leeds (2011): Ex Post Evaluation of Cohesion Policy Interventions 
2000–2006 ﬁnanced by the Cohesion Fund – Work Package B: Cost-beneﬁt analysis of selected trans-
port projects. Appendix 1: High-Speed Railway Madrid – Barcelona in Spain (March 15, 2011).  
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/evaluation/pdf/expost2006/wpb_cs1_barcelona.
pdf (February 27, 2014).
Givoni, M. (2006): Development and Impact of the Modern High-Speed Train: A Review. In: Transport 
Reviews 26 (5), 593-611.
Givoni, M.; Dobruszkes, F. (2013): A review of ex-post evidence for mode substitution and induced 
demand following the introduction of high-speed rail. In: Transport Reviews 33(6), 720–742.
Grosch, M. (2016): Orient East Med. Second Work Plan of the European Coordinator Mathieu Grosch. 
Brussel/Bruxelles.
Grosch, M. (2018): Orient East Med. Third Work Plan of the European Coordinator Mathieu Grosch. 
Brussel/Bruxelles.
Jandová, M.; Tomeš, Z.; Nash, C. (2016): High - Speed Rail for Central and Eastern European Coun-
tries: A Conference Report. In: Review of Economic Experiences, 16 (3), 269–275.
Martí-Henneberg, J. (2013): European integration and national models for railway networks (1840–
2010). In: Journal of Transport Geography 26 (2013), 126–138.
Martí-Henneberg, J. (2017): The inﬂuence of the railway network on territorial integration in Europe 
(1870–1950). In Journal of Transport Geography 62 (2017), 160–171.
Nash, C. (2015): When to invest in high speed rail. In: Journal of Rail Transport Planning & Management 
5 (2015), 12–22.
Panteia (Ed.) (2012). Carrying out a study on the completion of the Priority Project Nr 22 – Final 
Report, Zoetermeer.
SBB (Ed.) (1983). Oﬃzielles Kursbuch Sommer 1983.
Švehlík, M. (2015): Rapid Services – A reason to develop 21st century railway network. Presentation at 
ARL Corridor 22 meeting. Praha 26 November 2015.
Troeva, V. (2017): Transport, Mobility and Accessibility in Regional and Spatial Development Docu-
ments, Presentation at ARL Corridor 22 meeting, Soﬁa 21 November 2017.
Vickerman, R. (2015): High-speed rail and regional development: the case of intermediate stations. In: 
Journal of Transport Geography 42 (2015), 157–165.
Author
Peter Endemann (*1970), holds a Master in Urban Planning and Urban Design (Uni-
versité de Montréal, Québec, Canada) as well as a Diploma in Spatial Planning (Univer-
sität Dortmund, Germany). He is employed at Regionalverband FrankfurtRheinMain 
(Germany), an intermunicipal planning institution. Before, he was a transport planner 
in the municipality of Ettlingen (Germany) and a researcher at the ILS institute in Dort-
mund (Germany). His main activities comprise travel behaviour analysis, regional rail 
activities and corridor development with a focus on freight and passenger rail. He is a 
member of several transport related committees, author of numerous papers, and 
regularly reviews articles of international transport journals.
